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Abstract
Traditional market makers are losing their importance as automated systems have largely
assumed the role of liquidity provision in markets. We update the model of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) to analyze this new world: we add multiple securities and introduce an
automated market maker who uses the relationships between securities to price order flow.
This new automated participant transacts the majority of orders, sets prices that are more
efficient, and increases informed and decreases uninformed traders’ transaction costs. These
results can explain the recent dominance of high frequency trading in US markets and the
corresponding increase in trading volume and decrease in transaction costs for US stocks.
Keywords: algorithmic trading; automated trading; high frequency trading; market mak-
ing; specialist; statistical arbitrage.
JEL Classification: G14, G19.
Traditionally, stock exchanges have appointed specialists or market makers to keep or-
derly markets and continually supply liquidity for specific securities. For many years, these
individuals played a key role in determining prices and participated in a large fraction of
trading. Today, this is no longer the case. If you were to transact in the market right now,
the counterparty to your trade is more likely to be a computer than a human. Over the past
decade, the task of liquidity provision has largely shifted from traditional market makers to
proprietary automated systems that trade at high frequency and across different exchanges
and securities.
Why are automated systems replacing traditional market makers, and should we be
worried about this development? Does this type of trading benefit the economy, or does it
manipulate prices and take advantage of unsophisticated investors?
These questions are motivated by recent developments in US stock markets. The special-
ists’ fraction of trading volume at the NYSE has dropped precipitously in the last decade.1
Contemporaneous with this decline has been a large and steady increase in high frequency (or
low latency) automated trading.2 This type of trading is dominated by a handful of skilled
firms who provide liquidity to the market using proprietary algorithms which, they claim,
benefit investors by reducing transaction costs and making prices more efficient. Given that
these firms transact the majority of orders in the market, yet remain secretive and make large
profits in undisclosed ways, it is not surprising that skeptics have questioned the integrity of
their trading strategies and have called for government oversight of their activity.3
In this paper, we develop a model that can explain several characteristics of high fre-
quency automated liquidity provision: why we should expect this type of trading to exist,
why firms with highly skilled employees dominate the space, why they trade in large vol-
1For reference, see Figs. 1,3 in Hendershott and Moulton (2009) where the specialists’ fraction of NYSE
volume declines from approximately 16% to 2.5% over the period January 1999 to May 2007. Total floor
trading itself went from approximately 52% to 8% over the same period.
2The TABB Group reports that high frequency trading went from 21% of market share in 2005 to 61%
in 2009. See “US Equity High Frequency Trading: Strategies, Sizing and Market Structure,” September 2,
2009, available at http://www.tabbgroup.com.
3See for example the recent article “High frequency trading: Why the robots must die,” May 7, 2010,
available at http://wallstreet.blogs.fortune.cnn.com.
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umes, why prices are more efficient as a result of their trading, and finally who benefits from
their presence. With a simple modification of the model, we also can explain how automated
liquidity provision leads to increased trading volume and decreased overall transaction costs.
Both of these trends have recently been observed for US stocks.4
The intuition behind the model is straightforward. If traditional market making is de-
scribed as connecting investors who transact in the same security at different times, then
this new type of automated liquidity provision can be described as connecting investors who
transact simultaneously at different exchanges and/or in different, but related, securities.
For example, if two securities XYZ and ZYX are similar to each other, then a buyer in XYZ
and a seller in ZYX who are trading at the same time can be connected through the trades
of a liquidity provider willing to take the opposite side of each order. This liquidity provider
can undercut the prices set by traditional market makers because the opposite direction of
the trades makes it more likely one or both of the investors are uninformed.5 The oppo-
site direction of the trades also allows the liquidity provider to offset his/her inventory risk
(although we do not specifically analyze this effect here).
There are two main assumptions we make in the model. First, we assume that automated
liquidity providers set prices using information about all order flow in the market, but that
traditional market makers only use information about order flow in the security they trade.
This captures the main advantage that machines have over their human counterparts: they
can quickly and accurately process large amounts of relevant information when setting prices.
In real markets, we would not expect this assumption to strictly hold; human market makers
are known to use trading activity in related securities to help determine their prices.6 Our
4See Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2010) for an overview of the recently observed changes in US markets.
5If both traders where informed, why would one be buying and the other one selling? Because XYZ
and ZYX are similar, informed trading in these securities is more likely to be observed as contemporaneous
buying or selling in both rather than buying in one and selling in the other.
6The results we present hold whether this assumption is strictly true or only approximately true, but are
easier to present when strictly true. Many of the results also hold if the superior information of automated
liquidity providers was something else relevant to prices. For example, automated systems could be better
at accurately determining prices based on information about the state of the aggregate orderbook or the
likelihood that an observed imbalance in buying and selling continues, etc. We focus on cross-security
information because the relevance of this information to prices is uncontroversial and easily modelled.
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point is simply that automated systems are superior at this task.
The second key assumption we make is that profitable investors can be separated into
two types.7 Investors of the first type are informed investors who are able to correctly value
specific securities, possibly through superior analysis or because they are networked into
information flows about these securities. Investors of the second type are ‘quant’ traders
who are able to infer and correctly quantify the complex relationships between the values
of different securities—they need not understand how or why these relationships exist. If
these different investor types exist and are separate, then information is incorporated into
prices in the following way: it arrives through the trading activity of informed investors
and is fully processed and applied to the rest of the market by ‘quant’ traders. These ideas
are related to arbitrage pricing theory and statistical arbitrage.8 To obtain clean results,
we assume that the ‘quant’ traders are strict liquidity providers who only transact against
market orders, and that they are competitive such that their profits are driven to zero. In
reality we would expect these traders to also trade aggressively (by using market orders) and
to make sufficient profits for their existence.
The model we detail below is an extension of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Instead of
using a single security, we include multiple securities, and we introduce a new type of liquidity
provider called an automated market maker. This individual is our implementation of the
‘quant’ trader discussed above. We assume the automated market maker is competitive such
that she requires no price concession and makes zero expected profit. We show that in this
case, she transacts the majority of order flow and that traditional market makers are largely
priced out of the market. This does not occur in an obvious way because average spreads
remain unchanged. Instead, it occurs because the automated market maker is better able
to distinguish informed from uninformed order flow and therefore sets prices more precisely.
7In the model, this separation is enforced by the dealership structure of the market.
8See the papers by Ross (1976) and Gatev, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst (2006). The correspondence
between high frequency trading and statistical arbitrage is made by high frequency firms themselves. See the
commentary from Tradeworx, Inc. entitled “Tradeworx, Inc. Public Commentary on SEC Market Structure
Concept Release,” April 21, 2010, available at http://www.tradeworx.com.
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This means that prices are more efficient due to her activity, and that transaction costs are
increased for informed investors and decreased for uninformed investors. By extending the
model to allow uninformed investors to trade more readily when their transaction costs are
low, we also observe increased trading volumes and decreased overall transaction costs.
There are numerous studies that are related to this work. Informed trading in a multi-
asset setting has been modeled in several papers as an extension of the one-asset equilibrium
model of Kyle (1985).9 In these papers, the relationships between securities’ prices are
fully specified by the covariance matrix of returns, and all participants have knowledge of
this matrix. Here, we assume securities are related in a more general way, and we only
allow the automated market maker to understand and/or act on these relationships. This
has two benefits. First, it replicates the realistic scenario that sophisticated automated
systems are needed to collect and instantaneously process order flow information from the
entire market. Second, it provides a natural explanation for the existence of statistical
arbitrage opportunities in markets: that they result from the inability or disinterest of
informed investors to apply their security-specific information to the rest of the market.
There are other models that are similar in spirit to our work. For example Boulatov,
Hendershott, and Livdan (2010) and Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2009) study
how information is incorporated into a market with multiple related securities. They de-
velop models where informed trading in one security or type of security leads to cross-
autocorrelations in the market. Our model includes correlated price changes, but we do not
observe cross-autocorrelations because we assume information is processed and applied to
the market instantaneously by the automated market maker. If this assumption was relaxed
for some securities, then cross-autocorrelations would result.
The cost of liquidity provision has been described in various ways in previous papers
and can be subdivided into three main categories: order-handling costs, inventory costs, and
adverse selection costs (see Biais, Glosten, and Spatt (2005) for an overview). In this paper,
9See Caballe´ and Krishnan (1994), Bernhardt and Taub (2008), and Pasquariello and Vega (2009).
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we focus only on the adverse selection component and do not consider order-handling or
inventory costs. Similar results would hold if these other costs were considered. For example,
Andrade, Chang, and Seasholes (2008) develop a multi-asset equilibrium model where risk-
averse liquidity providers accommodate noninformational trading imbalances. They show
that demand shocks in one security will lead to cross-stock price pressure due to the hedging
desires of liquidity providers, even without considering information effects.
Our theoretical results nicely mirror recent empirical findings by Hendershott and Rior-
dan (2009). They report that computer generated trades contribute more to price discovery
than human trading, and that computer generated quotes are at more efficient prices than hu-
man quotes. They suggest that improvements in the speed and quality of access to electronic
order books has spurred the use of automated trading. We suggest that information about
the relationships between securities can also improve computer generated price discovery.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section I presents the model, Section II analyzes
a two security market, Section III provides an example, Section IV extends the model, and
Section V concludes.
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I The Model
As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), we assume a pure dealership market where informed
investors and liquidity traders submit unit-sized buy and sell orders for a security with a
random end-of-period value. These orders are priced and cleared by a competitive, risk
neutral market maker. Unlike the original Glosten and Milgrom model, we include multiple
securities—each with a separate market maker and separate informed investors and liquidity
traders—and introduce a new type of competitive, risk neutral liquidity provider called an
automated market maker. The automated market maker is unique in that she is the only
market participant who trades in multiple securities and understands how their end-of-period
values are related; everyone else is unaware of this, unable to model it correctly, or does not
have the sophistication to trade broadly and quickly on this information.
Each round of trading takes place in two steps. In the first step, one unit-sized order is
submitted for each of the N > 1 securities in the market. These orders arrive randomly and
anonymously from the pool of liquidity traders and informed investors within each security.
Liquidity traders are uninformed of the end-of-period value for the security they trade, are
equally likely to buy or sell this security, and are always willing to accept the best price
set by the liquidity providers.10 Informed investors know with certainty the end-of-period
value for the security that they trade, and they submit a buy or sell order based on this
information. If the end-of-period value is above the expected transaction price, they will
place a buy order, and if it is below the expected transaction price, they will place a sell
order. The probability that an order for security i is from an informed investor is public
knowledge, is assumed to be larger than zero but less than one, and is denoted γi. A buy
order for security i is denoted Bi and a sell order is denoted Si.
In the second step, liquidity providers observe the set of orders placed, determine the
prices at which they are willing to transact, and then transact with an order if their price is
the most competitive. If the market maker for security i and the automated market maker
10This is the case of perfectly inelastic demand in the original Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model. We
relax this assumption in Section IV.
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set the same price for a transaction, then we assume each partakes in half of the trade.
Notice that we assume prices are set by liquidity providers after all orders have been placed,
whereas in the original Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, quotes are set by the liquidity
provider before transactions take place. In real markets, transactions occur randomly in
time across securities, and quotes for any particular security will be dynamically updated as
transactions occur in other related securities. For simplicity, we assume these updates are
collapsed into one moment in time.
We assume that the true value of security i can take on one of two possible values at the
end of the trading period, V˜i = Vi, where Vi ∈ {V
+
i , V
−
i } and,
V +i = pi + ri, (1)
V −i = pi − ri. (2)
ri is a constant that sets the scale of price changes for security i. For simplicity, we assume
that each of these occur with probability 1/2 so that the unconditional expected value
of security i is pi. Everyone in the model is aware of these possible outcomes and their
probabilities.
We assume that the value of securities are related to one another such that,
P (Vi) 6= P (Vi|Vj) 6= P (Vi|Vj, Vk) 6= · · · 6= P (Vi|Vj, Vk, . . . , VN). (3)
This information is not known to the traders or the market makers, but it is known to the
automated market maker and used to price transactions.
In general, the end of the trading period can occur at some distant point in the future, so
that there can be multiple rounds of trading before the end-of-period value for each security
is revealed. To simplify the analysis, and because our main results hold for only one round
of trading, we only analyze the case where the trading period ends after one round. When
presenting results, we implicitly assume that many of these trading periods have taken place
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and we take averages over the outcomes.
Because liquidity providers are competitive and risk neutral, they set prices such that
they expect to make zero profit on their trades (see Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). For
example, in a market with only one security, both the market maker and the automated
market maker would set the price of an order at the expected value of the security given the
order,
E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣B1
]
= p1 + γ1r1, (4)
E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣S1
]
= p1 − γ1r1. (5)
Therefore, a buy order transacts at price p1 + γ1r1 and a sell order at price p1 − γ1r1 in
this scenario. Because orders are cleared at these prices, there is no expected profit for the
liquidity providers.
In the propositions below, we assume that everyone is aware of the setup of the model
and has traded long enough to know what actions are optimal for them. After stating the
propositions and giving a short explanation of each, we prove them for a two security mar-
ket. Proofs for markets with more than two securities are straightforward extensions of these
proofs and are available on request.
PROPOSITION 1. The market maker for security i transacts a minority of order flow
and competes with the automated market maker only on the widest spreads.
The market maker cannot compete with the automated market maker on pricing be-
cause he is not using information about the relationships between securities. If he sets prices
to their expected value given his information, he will find himself transacting unprofitable
orders and not transacting profitable ones. This is because the automated market maker
knows which orders are profitable at these prices; she takes the profitable ones away from the
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market maker by pricing them more aggressively and leaves the unprofitable ones by pricing
them less aggressively. Because the market maker is transacting unprofitable orders (which
contain a larger fraction of informed trades), he must widen his spread in price between buy
orders and sell orders. The equilibrium point for him is not reached until he is using the
overall highest and lowest prices set by the automated market maker.
PROPOSITION 2. With the addition of the automated market maker, the spread in av-
erage transaction price between buys and sells in security i remains the same, but is smaller
for liquidity traders and larger for informed investors.
The automated market maker is unable to reduce spreads because the unconditional
probability of an order arriving from an informed versus a liquidity trader for each security
remains unchanged. She, however, can use information about the orders placed in other
securities to help distinguish if a particular order is likely from an informed investor vs. a
liquidity trader. She uses this information to price these situations differently. Informed
investors receive worse prices because they now compete with one another across securities;
this means the average spread in price between a buy and a sell increases for them. Liquidity
traders receive better prices because their trades can be connected to other liquidity traders
in different securities through the actions of the automated market maker. For these traders
there is a decrease in the average spread in price between buys and sells.
PROPOSITION 3. With the addition of the automated market maker, prices are more ef-
ficient, i.e., on average, the transaction price for security i is closer to its end-of-period value.
The automated market maker uses a better information set than that used by the market
maker and can therefore price order flow more precisely. This means the transaction price
is, on average, closer to the security’s end-of-period value. This effect is most pronounced in
9
securities that have a small proportion of informed trading.
In the original Glosten and Milgrom (1985) paper, as the liquidity provider observes more
order flow, transaction prices approach the security’s fundamental value. This proposition
documents the same effect, but now it occurs because the automated market maker can
observe ‘order flow substitutes’ for security i by observing the orders for the rest of the
securities in the market.
II Two Security Market
In what follows, we prove the propositions for a two security market where P (V +1 |V
+
2 ) =
φ.
A Proposition 1
There are four possible order flow states in this market, (B1, B2), (B1, S2), (S1, B2), (S1, S2).
Because the values of the two securities are related to each other, and because informed in-
vestors trade in both, certain order flow states will be observed more often than others.
For example, when the values of security 1 and security 2 are positively correlated, then
the states (B1, B2) and (S1, S2) are more likely to occur, and the orders in these states are
more likely to be informed. The automated market maker is aware of this and sets prices
accordingly. She sets the transaction price of orders for security 1, T1, to the expected value
of security 1 conditioned on the particular order flow state. This is calculated as follows,
T1(B1, B2) = E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣B1, B2
]
= p1 +
γ1 + (2φ− 1)γ2
1 + (2φ− 1)γ1γ2
r1, (6)
T1(B1, S2) = E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣B1, S2
]
= p1 +
γ1 − (2φ− 1)γ2
1− (2φ− 1)γ1γ2
r1, (7)
T1(S1, B2) = E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣S1, B2
]
= p1 −
γ1 − (2φ− 1)γ2
1− (2φ− 1)γ1γ2
r1, (8)
T1(S1, S2) = E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣S1, S2
]
= p1 −
γ1 + (2φ− 1)γ2
1 + (2φ− 1)γ1γ2
r1. (9)
10
B1
S2
B2
S1
S2
B2
p1
p1 + γ1r1
p1 − γ1r1
p1 +
γ1−(2φ−1)γ2
1−(2φ−1)γ1γ2
r1
p1 −
γ1+(2φ−1)γ2
1+(2φ−1)γ1γ2
r1
p1 +
γ1+(2φ−1)γ2
1+(2φ−1)γ1γ2
r1
p1 −
γ1−(2φ−1)γ2
1−(2φ−1)γ1γ2
r1
Figure 1: Diagram of the transaction prices for security 1 in the 4 possible order flow states,
(B1, B2), (B1, S2), (S1, B2), (S1, S2), in a two security market. The values shown at earlier
nodes are not transaction prices, but are the expected price at those nodes.
The transaction prices in Eqs. 6-9 are shown in diagram form in Fig.1. The market maker
for security 1 is unaware of the importance of conditioning prices on the order in security 2
(or is simply unable to do so), and therefore does not use Eqs. 6-9 to price order flow. He is
aware of the following,
E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣B1
]
= p1 + γ1r1, (10)
E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣S1
]
= p1 − γ1r1. (11)
The market maker would set prices at these values if the automated market maker were not
present.
In what follows, we assume that φ is restricted to (1/2, 1], such that the values of security
1 and 2 are positively correlated. The results would be similar, although with some signs
and descriptions reversed, if they were negatively correlated. The propositions hold in either
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case. Because γ1 and γ2 are restricted to (0, 1), it is straightforward to show that,
E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣B1, B2
]
> E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣B1
]
> E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣B1, S2
]
←
→
E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣S1, B2
]
> E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣S1
]
> E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣S1, S2
]
,
(12)
where ←
→
denotes that E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣B1, S2
]
and E
[
V˜1
∣∣∣S1, B2
]
may be switched in this ordering.
Notice that the automated market maker sets the price for B1 more aggressively when it is
accompanied by S2 and more timidly when accompanied by B2 (with the opposite results
for S1). The automated market maker realizes that the opposite direction of orders makes it
more likely both investors are uninformed and that the same direction makes it more likely
they are informed, and she prices them accordingly. Because the market maker does not
realize this, his role is marginalized. Suppose the market maker tried to set prices according
to Eqs. 10-11. If he transacted a random sampling of orders at these prices, he would make
zero expected profit. Unfortunately for him, the automated market maker ensures that
his transactions are not a random sampling. She transacts orders that would have been
profitable to him by pricing them more aggressively (this occurs for (B1, S2) and (S1, B2),
see Eq. 12), and she allows him to transact orders that are unprofitable because she prices
them less aggressively (this occurs for (B1, B2) and (S1, S2), see Eq. 12). Because the market
maker is now receiving a larger fraction of informed trading, he is forced to widen his spread
until he expects to make zero profit. This occurs at the widest spread set by the automated
market maker. This same argument applies to the market maker for security 2.
We have assumed that when the market maker and automated market maker set the
same price for a transaction, they each partake in half of the trade. This means that the
fraction of order flow transacted by the market maker is equal to 1/2 of the proportion of
order flow at the widest spread. This is,
P (B1, B2)/2 + P (S1, S2)/2 = [1 + (2φ− 1)γ1γ2] /4. (13)
Because γ1 and γ2 are restricted to (0, 1) and φ is restricted to (1/2, 1], the maximum value
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of this equation is less than 1/2. Therefore, the market maker in security 1 trades a minority
of order flow. The same argument applies to the market maker for security 2.
B Proposition 2
We can calculate the expected transaction price of informed investors when buying and
selling security 1 as follows,
E [T1|B1, I1] = E [T1|B1, B2, I1]P (B2|B1, I1) + E [T1|B1, S2, I1]P (S2|B1, I1), (14)
E [T1|S1, I1] = E [T1|S1, S2, I1]P (S2|S1, I1) + E [T1|S1, B2, I1]P (B2|S1, I1), (15)
where the conditioning variable I1 means the order for security 1 was from an informed
investor. The expected spread in price between buying and selling security 1 for an informed
investor, ∆1,I , is therefore,
∆1,I = 2γ1r1
{
1
γ1
−
(1/γ1 − 1)[1− (2φ− 1)
2γ22 ]
1− (2φ− 1)2γ21γ
2
2
}
(16)
In a similar way, we calculate the spread between buying and selling security 1 for a liquidity
trader, ∆1,L,
∆1,L = 2γ1r1
[
1− (2φ− 1)2γ22
1− (2φ− 1)2γ21γ
2
2
]
(17)
∆1,I and ∆1,L are to be compared to the unconditional spread, ∆1, which can be calculated
as follows,
∆1 = γ1∆1,I + (1− γ1)∆1,L, (18)
= 2γ1r1. (19)
This is just the spread that would be observed without the automated market maker (sub-
tract Eq. 11 from Eq. 10). The same argument applies for security 2. In Fig. 2, we diagram
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Informed
investor
B1
S1
B1 p1 + γ1r1
p1 − γ1r1
S1
Unconditional
Liquidity
trader
B1
S1
p1 +
{
1
γ1
−
(1/γ1−1)[1−(2φ−1)
2γ2
2
]
1−(2φ−1)2γ2
1
γ2
2
}
γ1r1
p1 −
{
1
γ1
−
(1/γ1−1)[1−(2φ−1)
2γ2
2
]
1−(2φ−1)2γ2
1
γ2
2
}
γ1r1
p1 −
1−(2φ−1)2γ2
2
1−(2φ−1)2γ2
1
γ2
2
γ1r1
p1 +
1−(2φ−1)2γ2
2
1−(2φ−1)2γ2
1
γ2
2
γ1r1
Figure 2: Diagram of the average buy and sell transaction price for informed investors,
liquidity traders, and unconditional on trader type. Notice that informed investors realize
a larger spread than liquidity traders, and that the spread without the automated market
maker is the expected spread over both of these trader types.
these results.
Because γ1 and γ2 are restricted to (0, 1), and φ is restricted to [0, 1/2) or (1/2, 1], then
it is straightforward to show that,
∆1,I > ∆1 > ∆1,L (20)
so that the spread is increased for informed investors and decreased for liquidity traders.
The same argument applies for security 2.
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C Proposition 3
To determine the inefficiency of transaction prices, we calculate the expected absolute
difference between V˜1 and the transaction price, T1,
E
[
|V˜1 − T1|
]
= E
[
|V˜1 − T1|
∣∣∣I1
]
P (I1) + E
[
|V˜1 − T1|
∣∣∣L1
]
P (L1). (21)
where I1 and L1 denote that the order in security 1 was placed by an informed investor and
a liquidity trader respectively. Calculating this, we have,
E
[
|V˜1 − T1|
]
= (1− γ1)
[
1 +
1− (2φ− 1)2γ22
1− (2φ− 1)2γ21γ
2
2
γ1
]
r1. (22)
Without the automated market maker, the expected absolute difference between the end-of-
period value and the transaction price is,
E
[
|V˜1 − T1|
∣∣∣No Auto MM] = (1− γ1)(1 + γ1)r1. (23)
Because γ1 and γ2 are restricted to (0, 1), and φ is restricted to [0, 1/2) or (1/2, 1], then it is
straightforward to show,
E
[
|V˜1 − T1|
]
< E
[
|V˜1 − T1|
∣∣∣No Auto MM] , (24)
so that transaction prices in security 1 are closer to the end-of-period value for security 1
when the automated market maker is included. The same argument applies for security 2.
III An Example
As an example, consider a two security market with the following parameters: γ1 = γ2 =
.5, P (V +1 |V
+
2 ) = φ = 0.9, p1 = 50, and r1 = 1. Fig. 3 shows the transaction prices set for
security 1 by the automated market maker conditioned on different order flow states. The
15
B1
S2
B2
S1
S2
49.5
50.75
50.125
B2
50
50.5
49.25
49.875
Figure 3: Diagram of the transaction prices for security 1 in the 4 possible order flow states,
(B1, B2), (B1, S2), (S1, B2), (S1, S2), in a two security market. The values shown at earlier
nodes are not transaction prices, but are the expected price at those nodes. The parameters
used are: γ1 = γ2 = .5, φ = 0.9, p1 = 50, and r1 = 1.
Informed
investor
B1
B1
Unconditional
Liquidity
trader
B1
S1
50.5625
49.4375
50.4375
49.5625
50.5
} }
}
1
1.125
0.875
S1
49.5
S1
Figure 4: Diagram of the average buy and sell transaction price for informed investors,
liquidity traders, and unconditional on trader type. Notice that informed investors realize a
larger spread than uninformed investors. The parameters used are γ1 = γ2 = .5, φ = 0.9,
p1 = 50, and r1 = 1.
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market maker will price orders using only the highest and lowest price in the figure, which
is 50.75 for a buy and 49.25 for a sell. The proportion of order flow he transacts is equal to
1/2 the proportion of orders at the widest spread. Using Eq. 13, this is 30% of the orders
for security 1. This means the automated market maker transacts the other 70%, and that
the automated market maker transacts the majority of order flow.
The average spread in the price between buy orders and sell orders is 1 overall, 0.875 for
liquidity traders, and 1.125 for informed investors. These values are shown in Fig. 4. Notice
that the spread increases for informed investors and decreases for liquidity traders with the
addition of the automated market maker.
The average difference between the transaction price and the end-of-period value of se-
curity 1 is 0.71875 when the automated market maker is present, and is 0.75 when she is
not. This means prices are more efficient with the addition of the automated market maker.
IV Extension of Model
Whereas before we assumed that liquidity traders were always willing to buy or sell, we
now extend the model to allow liquidity traders to refrain from trading if their expected
transaction cost is too high. Specifically we assume that the fraction of liquidity traders
who are willing to submit an order is a monotonically decreasing function of their expected
transaction cost. This means the following two propositions hold:
PROPOSITION 4. In the extended model, with the addition of the automated market
maker, the probability of a transaction in security i increases, i.e., expected volumes increase.
When the automated market maker is added to the market, the expected transaction
cost of a liquidity trader is reduced (Proposition 2). In the extension of the model, we have
assumed this reduced cost increases the probability that a liquidity trader will place an order.
Trivially, this increases the overall probability of a transaction.
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PROPOSITION 5. In the extended model, with the addition of the automated market
maker, the spread in average transaction price between buys and sells in security i is reduced.
From the previous explanation for Proposition 4, we know that the addition of the auto-
mated liquidity provider increases the probability of a liquidity trader placing an order. This
decreases the fraction of orders that come from informed investors. When the fraction of
orders from informed investors decreases, adverse selection is reduced and liquidity providers
can set smaller spreads for buy and sell orders.
Below, we prove the new propositions for a two security market. Proofs for markets with
more than two securities are straightforward extensions of the two security case and are
available on request.
A Proposition 4
We denote the fraction of informed investors in security 1 by δ1 and the fraction of
liquidity traders who are willing to submit an order by pi1. The probability of a transaction
in security 1, P1, is therefore,
P1 = δ1 + (1− δ1)pi1. (25)
The expected transaction cost of a liquidity trader is 1/2 the expected spread, which is ∆1,L/2
(Eq. 17). Without the automated market maker, this would be ∆1/2 (Eq. 18). Because pi1
is a monotonically decreasing function of the liquidity traders’ expected transaction costs,
and because ∆1,L/2 < ∆1/2, then pi1 is larger when the automated market maker is added.
Therefore, the probability of a transaction in security 1, P1, is also larger when the automated
market maker is added. The same argument applies for security 2.
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B Proposition 5
The fraction of orders for security i that come from informed investors is,
γ1 = 1− (1− δ1)pi1. (26)
As shown in the proof of Proposition 4, pi1 is larger when the automated market maker is
added. Therefore, from Eq. 26, γ1 is smaller. The unconditional average spread in price
between buying and selling in security 1 is given in Eq. 19, ∆1 = 2γ1r1, and is therefore
reduced when the automated market maker is added. The same argument applies for security
2.
V Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to explain the increasing dominance of automated liquidity
provision and to understand its effects on the market. In the model posited above, we show
that automated liquidity providers are able to price securities more precisely than traditional
market makers. As a result, they transact the majority of order flow and cause prices to be
more efficient. This occurs not only because they trade across securities instantaneously, but
also because their actions are determined by highly skilled individuals who accurately model
the complex relationships between securities. Traditional market makers simply cannot
compete on either front.
The presence of automated liquidity providers has material effects on investors in the
market. Informed investors make smaller profits and uninformed investors lose less money.
Informed investors make smaller profits because they must now compete with one another
across securities. Uninformed investors lose less money because they are able to transact
through the liquidity provider to other uninformed investors in related securities. If the
uninformed increase their trading activity due to lower transaction costs, overall volumes
increase and overall transaction costs are reduced. These results match nicely with recently
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observed changes in US markets, where high frequency automated trading now dominates.
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